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Abstract. Program obfuscation is increasingly popular among malware
creators. Objectively comparing different malware detection approaches
with respect to their resilience against obfuscation is challenging. To the
best of our knowledge, there is no common empirical framework for eval-
uating the resilience of malware detection approaches w.r.t. behavior ob-
fuscation. We propose and implement such a framework that obfuscates
the observable behavior of malware binaries. To assess the framework’s
utility, we use it to obfuscate known malware binaries and then inves-
tigate the impact on detection effectiveness of different n-gram based
detection approaches. We find that the obfuscation transformations em-
ployed by FEEBO significantly affect the precision of such detection
approaches. Several n-gram-based approaches can hence be concluded
not to be resilient against this simple kind of obfuscation.
1 Introduction
Malware continues to be a relevant cyber security threat. While in the early
days of the Internet malware was often developed for the pure sake of curiosity,
malware development today follows a clear-cut business model. The motivations
to develop and utilize malware ranges from supporting cyber espionage over
theft of confidential data, denial-of-service of commercial services, or even black-
mailing, up to tampering with military or civilian infrastructures.
Industry and academia continuously devise countermeasures to cope with
this threat in form of advanced malware detection approaches. However, malware
developers are often several steps ahead the state of the art. Most commercial
antivirus software in principle continues to be some form of signature-based
analysis on the persistent representation of potential malware. Not surprisingly,
almost all modern malware families employ some means to confuse and hamper
signature-based approaches. Such countermeasures range from simple techniques
(e.g. build-time encryption and runtime decryption up), to more sophisticated
techniques (e.g. control-flow obfuscation or anti-debugging mutations) [6].
Given control-flow obfuscation of today’s malware, one intuitively appro-
priate detection strategy is so-called behavioral detection. The idea is to look
at the malware’s runtime behavior rather than its static code. This behavior
includes issued function or system calls, or in general, every runtime interac-
tion with system resources. By construction, behavioral detection approaches
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are barely affected by control-flow obfuscation. However, although behavioral
detection techniques compensate the effects of (build-time) control-flow obfus-
cation techniques to a large extent, they are often vulnerable to more advanced
(run-time) behavior obfuscation techniques that “blur” the externally visible be-
havior of malware. Examples for such behavior obfuscation techniques include
the injection of bogus system calls or the deliberate randomized re-ordering of
call execution sequences.
While control-flow obfuscation of malware and respective countermeasures
at the detection side have been well researched [6], the effects of behavior obfus-
cation on the effectiveness of detection approaches so far only received very little
attention in the literature. Behavior obfuscation in itself has been discussed from
a theoretical perspective [7], but we are not aware of any empirical investigations
of the effects of behavior obfuscation of real-world malware.
To provide a foundation for such empirical evaluations, we propose a behav-
ior obfuscation framework which we call FEEBO. Provided an arbitrary malware
sample as input, it applies a diverse set of behavior obfuscation transformations
to its externally visible behavior, which is defined by issued system calls. This
makes it possible to “inject” behavior obfuscation mechanisms into malware
samples in a structured and targeted way, regardless of whether or not the spe-
cific malware sample performs any behavior obfuscation itself. Considering that
behavior obfuscation at the system call level is still rarely done by real-world
malware, this approach allows us to get one step ahead of malware developers
and reason about the impact of such obfuscation techniques on state of the art
detection approaches before they are implemented and released into the wild.
Contributions: a) To our best knowledge, we are the first to propose an
empirical malware behavior obfuscation framework that is able to behaviorally
obfuscate standard malware binaries. b) With FEEBO we establish a basis for a
wide range of reproducible behavioral obfuscation resilience experiments. c) Our
evaluations show that for certain configurations, the precision of n-gram [15]
based detection approaches are significantly affected by behavioral obfuscation.
Organization: We introduce the concept of behavior obfuscation and discuss
two main representative n-gram-based behavioral detection techniques in §2.
Then we describe the design and implementation of FEEBO in §3. We show the
effectiveness of a prototypical implementation of our framework and discuss its
limitations in §4. We discuss possible application areas of our approach and give
an outlook on future work in §5.
2 Preliminaries
We start with some relevant concepts from the literature. In particular we recall
related work on behavior obfuscation and detection based on n-grams.
2.1 Behavior Obfuscation
This paper is inspired by the work of Pe´choux and Ta [11] on behavior ob-
fuscation of malware. They divide the behavior, i.e. executed operations of a
program (e.g. malware) into (i) internal computations and (ii) system calls. In-
ternal computations operate only on the process memory of the corresponding
program and they only affect and are affected by the information stored inside
this process’ memory. System calls represent interactions with the operating
system (OS) kernel, i.e. there is a transfer of control from the corresponding
program to the kernel and back. Therefore, system calls affect and are affected
by the information stored anywhere in the OS memory.
The sequence of system calls performed by a program is called the observable
(execution) path or behavior. Pe´choux and Ta show that it is possible to trans-
form (obfuscate) the observable path of known malware samples such that the
original malware functionality is preserved by: (i) inserting system calls before
and/or after system calls in the observable path, (ii) reordering system calls in
the observable path and (iii) substitution of system calls by other system calls
which provide at least the same functionality. Different from our work, their goal
is to obtain a trace that is similar to a goodware trace (mimicry). We, on the
other hand, focus on randomly generating sets of malware “mutants” to assess
their effect on behavioral detection approaches that analyze the system calls
executed by malware.
There is an important difference between behavior obfuscation and control-
flow obfuscation. Control-flow obfuscation applies transformations at the source
code or intermediate representation levels in order to make a program harder to
understand by a human or an automated analysis engine. Such code transfor-
mations include virtualization obfuscation, insertion of bogus code via opaque
predicates, function splitting, and control-flow flattening [6]. These transforma-
tion will typically not have an effect on the observable execution path of that
program. On the other hand, behavior obfuscation strictly implies changing the
observable execution path of the program being obfuscated.
2.2 Behavioral Malware Detection
In contrast to approaches that focus on the persistent representation of malware,
behavioral detection approaches discriminate malware from goodware by estab-
lishing characteristic behavior profiles. Such approaches range from using raw
system call traces to short sequences of calls, so-called n-grams [9,14,15], to more
elaborate concepts that model the semantic interdependencies between different
calls in call-graphs [10,5,4]. There also exist approaches that model behavior
by abstracting system calls into induced data flows [1,3]. These approaches are
based on traces of issued system calls and are thus likely to be affected by the
aforementioned behavior obfuscation transformations.
In this study we focus on approaches that base on n-grams as a behavior
model, due to its prevalence in academic publications [15]. We are aware that
findings based on this model do not necessarily generalize. Nevertheless we are
convinced that such an evaluation is a good starting point to reason about the
effects of behavior obfuscation in general and will be the basis for future work.
To cover a broad range of n-gram based detection approaches, we follow the
categorization schema of Canali et al. [2]. We consider n-grams built on system
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Fig. 1: Call trace vs. ordered n-gram (a) vs. unordered n-gram (b)
calls without arguments as atoms and both a) considering or b) ignoring the
ordering of calls for their construction. To test the aforementioned approaches
we first executed known malware and goodware in a sandboxed environment
and monitored their executed system calls. This procedure yielded labeled event
logs, which we tokenized with a sliding window, moving a window of defined but
fixed size over the respective log, thus yielding sets of n-grams of system calls.
For the first n-gram approach, which considers the ordering of system calls
(a), we directly feed the obtained n-grams as features into a supervised machine
learning classifier. For the second n-gram approach (b), which does not consider
the ordering of system calls (b), we count the number of occurrences of each
system call in the n-gram, build a feature vector with the number of occurrences
of each of the system calls in the n-gram, and feed these vectors into the classifier.
Note the independence of the feature vectors from the ordering of system calls
in the n-gram.
Figure 1 depicts the resulting feature vectors for both approaches when ap-
plied to a small sample call trace (left). The middle shows n-grams for approach
(a), consisting of 4 system calls on each row (i.e, 4-grams). The contents of the
cells are the initials of the system calls from the trace to the left. The table on
the right part shows n-grams for approach (b), which consist of the frequency
of every system call (depicted in the table header) for a 4-gram on each row.
3 Our Approach to Behavior Obfuscation
Transforming (obfuscating) x86 binary programs without debugging symbols is
a non-trivial task which involves binary rewriting [12]. This task becomes even
more challenging when the binaries we want to transform are malware, which
employ anti-disassembly techniques [8]. However, since we only want the binary
to have a different observable behavior in terms of systems calls, we have taken
an alternative approach by using binary instrumentation [13].
In a nutshell binary instrumentation allows one to intercept any system calls
performed by the target binary. One can choose to execute, delay, drop or even
swap the intercepted system call, plus perform other additional instructions in-
cluding making more system calls. We have implemented the following two be-
havior obfuscation transformations: (i) system call insertion and (ii) system call
reordering. These are relatively simple techniques in comparison to substitution
of system calls with functionally equivalent systems calls; we leave their imple-
mentation to future work.
3.1 System Call Insertion
With a given probability pi, system call insertion adds for each system call made
by the obfuscated application a number of additional system calls randomly
chosen from the previously executed system calls. The number of inserted system
calls is randomly chosen between mini and maxi , two more input parameters of
FEEBO. To prevent these inserted calls from changing the original functionality
of the application, we modify the values of their parameters in case the system
calls belong to a set S of calls that have side-effects such as writing to a file. The
values of the changed parameters are chosen such that they will not collide with
existing data, e.g., files. Furthermore, system calls that access a unique system
resource are excluded. For instance, if we were to insert the system call that
sets the clipboard data, we would need to also insert a second call to restore the
clipboard data since there is only one clipboard on each system.
For example, with pi = 0.25, mini = 2 and maxi = 5, every system call
made by the application has a 25% chance to insert a randomly chosen number
between 2 and 5 of system calls after the execution of the intercepted system
call. This obfuscation transformation changes the externally visible behavior by
inserting a random number of system calls in random locations of the original
execution trace. The intuition is that it should be effective against n-grams-based
detection approaches since they rely on patterns.
3.2 System Call Reordering
System call reordering can na¨ıvely be implemented by delaying a sequence of
system calls in a buffer which is randomly permuted before execution. This
would most likely break the functionality of the transformed program or even
cause it to crash. Instead, every system call in S executed by the transformed
application, can be delayed with probability pr and placed in a queue (of size
n) for later execution. The reason only calls in S are being delayed is that calls
outside S generally read information which applications need to continue their
proper execution. Moreover, we use a queue for the delayed system calls, because
we want to preserve the original ordering of system calls that have side effects
like writing to a file. Once the queue reaches a certain size, our tool will execute
them in their original order. Each of the delayed calls can additionally trigger
the insertion other system calls with similar parameters as described in §3.1, i.e.
probability of insertion denoted pri and the minimum and maximum number of
inserted system calls, denoted by minri, respectively max ri.
For example, for pr = 0.5, n = 5, pri = 0.75, minri = 1 and max ri = 2, every
system call from S made by the application is delayed with a 50% probability.
Once 5 calls have been delayed, they will be executed. Each of the delayed
executions has a 75% probability to insert one or two other system calls.
3.3 Obfuscation Profiles
The range of the input parameters of the previously described obfuscation trans-
formations are shown in Table 1. The insertion and reordering probabilities range
p{i,ri} min{i,ri} max{i,ri} pr n
System Call Insertion [0, 1] {0, . . . ,max{i,ri}} {min{i,ri}, . . . ,∞} – –
System Call Reordering [0, 1] {0, . . . ,max{i,ri}} {min{i,ri}, . . . ,∞} [0, 1] {0, . . . ,∞}
Table 1: Obfuscation transformations versus parameters
from 0 to 1. The minimum and maximum numbers of inserted system calls as
well as the size of the reordering queue are positive integers. Their upper bound
depends on the data type and the architecture of the system they are running
on. Based on these parameters of system call insertion and system call reorder-
ing we can configure various obfuscation profiles, e.g. “always insert 2 system
calls after each system call in the original observable path”, “do not insert any
calls, only reorder” or “insert 1 system call after each reordered call”. We will
see concrete detection values for different obfuscation profiles in §4.
4 Evaluation
To assess the applicability of FEEBO, we obfuscated a set of real-world malware
with the help of FEEBO and then applied the previously introduced behavior de-
tection approaches, based on n-grams of system calls, to the resulting obfuscated
system call traces.
Setup. We executed 100 malware samples within an installation of the Cuckoo
malware analysis sandbox1, where we replaced the behavior monitor with FEEBO
to obtain a variety of obfuscated behavior traces of those samples. In addition, we
collected the traces of 100 known goodware samples which we did not obfuscate,
to use as comparison baseline for later training the detection classifiers.
The large range of values that the obfuscation parameters can take (see
Table 1, quickly leads to a combinatorial explosion of the obfuscation profiles.
Moreover, to capture a critical mass of system calls sufficiently large to allow
training a classifier with good accuracy, we need to monitor a malware sample for
at least 3 minutes. With one configuration profile capturing the obfuscated traces
of 100 malware samples would then take 300 minutes which, with help of parallel
execution of multiple VMs on 5 cores, we could cut down to about one hour per
run. Therefore, we conducted experiments with 375 different combinations of
the obfuscation parameters. More specifically, we set all probabilistic parameters
like the insertion or reordering probability to selected values between 0% and
100%, i.e. p{i,r,ri} ∈ {0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0}, and particular interesting discrete
parameters to fixed values between 1 and 10, i.e. maxi ∈ {1, 5, 10}. All other
parameters were set to fixed values, i.e. min{i,ri} = 1, maxri = 3 and n = 5.
Conducting one evaluation for each configuration profile (e.g. one combination of
the aforementioned parameters and value ranges) ends up in 5× 5× 5× 3 = 375
runs, which sums up to a total runtime of about 16 days.
1 http://www.cuckoosandbox.org/.
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experiments. As we can see, the applied obfuscation transformations have a
significant e↵ect on the detection e↵ectiveness of the n-gram approaches. In the
first row of Figure 2 we can deduce a roughly quadratic relationship between an
increase of obfuscation degree and an decrease of the detection rate. Also we can
see, that the spread in classification accuracy, i.e. the standard deviation of the
detection rate, significantly rises the more obfuscation is applied. Furthermore
we can see that higher-order n-grams are more sensitive towards obfuscation.
Looking at the remaining diagrams we notice that insertion transformations
seem to have a bigger impact on detection accuracy than reordering transfor-
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Experiments. Using the resulting execution traces, we trained the respective
classifiers on the feature vectors computed on the non-obfuscated baseline traces
and used the generated classifier on the remaining obfuscated event traces. For
the ideal case of the applied obfuscations not having any effect on the externally
visible behavior, the detection rate should remain 100%. With this setting we
could investigate the effects of the applied obfuscation transformations with
respect to detection accuracy. To assess the effects of different n-gram sizes we
repeated this procedure for all possible n-grams for n between 3 and 10.
Figure 2 summarizes the experimental findings. As a measure of the degree
of obfuscation, we calculated the Levenshtein distance between the respective
traces, as it represents the number of atomic insertion, deletion, and substitution
operations that are needed to transform one event trace into another one. For
computing the Levenshtein distance we abstracted our traces to only the name
of the system calls (not their parameters), which are elements of our alphabet.
Correspondingly, the x-axis of each diagram represents the average obfuscation
degree of all considered event traces, whereas the y-axis represents the detection
rate (percentage of correctly identified malware samples) achieved by different
detection approaches. To visualize the development of the median detection rate
for increasing obfuscation degree we also plot trend-lines for each n-gram.
We split the evaluation results into three parts: the first row represents the re-
sults for the experiments where both type of obfuscation transformations, i.e. call
reordering and call insertion were applied; the second row illustrates the results
for the insertion experiments; and the last row the results from the reordering
experiments. As we can see, the applied obfuscation transformations have a sig-
nificant effect on the detection effectiveness of the n-gram approaches. In the
first row of Figure 2 we can deduce a roughly quadratic relationship between an
increase of obfuscation degree and an decrease of the detection rate. Also we can
see, that the spread in classification accuracy, i.e. the standard deviation of the
detection rate, significantly rises the more obfuscation is applied. Furthermore
we can see that higher-order n-grams are more sensitive towards obfuscation.
Looking at the remaining diagrams we notice that insertion transformations
seem to have a bigger impact on detection accuracy than reordering transforma-
tion, which is reflected in a significantly steeper slope of the trend-lines in the
insertion diagrams than in the reordering diagrams. Also we can say that for very
small n-gram sizes, reordering transformations seem to have barely any influence
on the detection rate, as can be seen by almost constantly high detection rates.
Finally, our evaluations did not reveal any significant difference in obfuscation
resilience between the ordered and unordered types of n-gram approaches.
Discussion and threats to validity. First note that although we only conducted
one execution run for one constellation of configuration parameter, the fact that
several parameter configurations lead to a sample with a similar Levenshtein
distance allows us to achieve a good saturation of the obfuscation spectrum.
Given that we obtain 375 distinct sets of 100 obfuscated event traces, for each
profile in our experiment, this gives a rather high density of 41 data-points in a
range of 20 units on the x-axis in the first row from Figure 2, which correspond to
the “both insertion and reordering” obfuscation profile. However, the density is 7
data-points in a range of 20 units for the second and third rows which correspond
to “insertion-only”, respectively “reordering-only” obfuscation profiles.
We intentionally did not mention false positive rates of the n-gram ap-
proaches in our evaluation, because they are not relevant for our experiments,
since we do not change or obfuscate the set of goodware during our experi-
ments. Currently our experimental setting assumes the presence of a certain
ground truth, i.e. the availability of a critical mass of unobfuscated malware for
classifier training. If malware developers start to make more use of behavioral
obfuscation mechanism the availability of such a basic training set is not guar-
anteed. Using obfuscated malware for both, testing and training the classifiers,
will likely diminish their effectiveness even more. For future work, we therefore
also plan on investigating whether these factors impact the results.
Having performed some initial experiments with Na¨ıve Bayes, Gaussian-
kernel SVMs, and Random Forest classifiers, we can confirm that the choice
of the baseline classifier does not have a significant effect on the relative obfus-
cation sensitivity of the considered n-gram approaches.
The functionality of any obfuscated program should include the functional-
ity of the original (non-obfuscated) program. For many software transformation
engines such as optimizing compilers, this is a strict requirement. However, even
very widely used compilers such as GCC or Clang have been found to contain
optimizations that break the functionality of the original source code [16]. The
system call reordering transformation described above suffers from the same
issue, i.e. it may change the functionality of malware such that it becomes in-
effective. Arguably, however, in the case of obfuscating widely used malware it
is more important to avoid detection even if the obfuscation engine will output
some samples which are not effective. We do not yet possess statistics regarding
the number of effective malware samples output by our tool. However we plan
to study this fact as part of future work. We still consider our results valuable
given that checking for behavioral equality in general is not decidable and in our
experiments none of the obfuscated malware samples crashed during execution.
In sum, we can draw two main conclusions from our experiments: a) FEEBO
is able to effectively obfuscate the behavior of real-world malware with significant
effect on the effectiveness of behavioral detection approaches; b) the considered
type of n-gram approaches is highly sensitive to the evaluated forms of behavior
obfuscation.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We have introduced FEEBO, a framework to conduct empirical experiments on
the effects of behavior obfuscation on malware detections. To this extent we de-
veloped a prototype that can apply certain obfuscation transformations to the
externally visible behavior of malware samples. To evaluate the effectiveness of
the implemented obfuscation transformations and of our approach in general, we
investigated the effects of a wide range of behavior obfuscation transformations
on the detection capabilities of two representative n-gram behavior detection ap-
proaches. We could show that both types of n-gram approaches are considerably
vulnerable to the applied obfuscation transformations.
We are aware that our presented evaluation results are not comprehensive in
its present form. In particular, for future work we plan to repeat the experiments
for a bigger configuration space and malware sets. We also plan to investigate the
effects of lack of ground truth by training the classifiers on obfuscated malware
samples instead on solely unobfuscated ones. In terms of possible extensions of
FEEBO, we plan to implement additional obfuscation transformations that e.g.
also tackle the substitution of certain system calls with semantically equivalent
ones.
Although we release FEEBO2 to parties from academia and industry, for
ethical reasons we will provide a version that is not capable of generating self-
contained obfuscated malware binaries. Instead, FEEBO needs to be manually
installed in the evaluation environment, together with a installation of Intel Pin
[13], which hopefully hampers misuse of FEEBO by malware developers.
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